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framework of corporate law into an economically derived model of production,
constructing a microeconomic description of large enterprises firmly rooted in
corporate doctrine but neither focused on nor limited by a description of
principal-agent relationships among shareholders and managers. This Article
shows that the model retains descriptive robustness, despite the substantial
accretion of shareholder power during the two decades since its appearance. The
Article also shows that the model taught three groundbreaking lessons to
corporate legal theory. First, nothing binds microeconomic analysis together
with a theory of the firm rooted in shareholder primacy. Second,
microeconomics, with its emphases on efficiency and maximization, can be
deployed in the service of an allocatively sensitive description of corporate
governance, providing a more capacious methodological tent than anyone in
corporate law understood prior to Blair and Stout’s intervention. Third, it is
not only possible but arguably necessary to take corporate law seriously when
articulating a microeconomic theory of corporate production. To the extent an
economic model’s description of the appropriate legal framework differs
materially from the inherited legal framework, there is a possible, even a
probable, infirmity in the model.
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INTRODUCTION
Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout published A Team Production
Theory of Corporate Law in the Virginia Law Review in 1999. 1 It is an
article that does not announce its own importance. Nor does it identify
a gap in the literature that it claims to fill. It stakes no explicit claim to
an innovative, brilliant contribution. It does not have to. A Team
Production Theory is the rare law review article that really does fill a
gap. In fact, at the time of its appearance, it filled several gaps and in
so doing made a brilliant and innovative theoretical contribution,
pushing the envelope of corporate legal theory in new and salubrious
directions. Were I asked to name the leading theoretical contributions
to corporate law literature in the last century, I would include it on a
shelf containing five books—Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means’s The
Modern Corporation and Private Property, 2 Melvin Eisenberg’s The
Structure of the Corporation, 3 Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel’s
The Economic Structure of Corporate Law, 4 Mark Roe’s Strong
Managers, Weak Owners, 5 and Henry Hansmann’s The Ownership
of Enterprise. 6
Blair and Stout set forth a team production model (“TPM”) of
corporate organization. The TPM explains both the legal corporate
entity and corporate governance institutions in microeconomic terms as
the means to the end of encouraging investment. In so doing, it situates
corporations within markets and subject to market constraints. The
model simultaneously insists that corporations remain independent of
markets and that the element of independence contributes materially
to their success as producers. The TPM also integrates the inherited
framework of corporate law into an economically derived model of
production. It offers a microeconomic description of the firm that is
firmly rooted in corporate doctrine but is neither focused on nor limited
by a description of principal-agent relationships among shareholders,
board members, and managers. The TPM retains descriptive
robustness, despite the substantial accretion of shareholder power
during the two decades since its appearance.
1.
Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA.
L. REV. 247 (1999).
2.
ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY (1932).
3.
MELVIN A. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION: A LEGAL ANALYSIS (1976).
4.
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW (1991).
5.
MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF AMERICAN
CORPORATE FINANCE (1994).
6.
HENRY HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE (1996).
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In thus leaving agency behind as it fused microeconomics and
legal doctrine into a theory of the firm, the TPM taught three
groundbreaking lessons, two about methodology and one about
substance. First, nothing binds microeconomic analysis together with a
theory of the firm that is rooted in shareholder primacy, shareholder
primacy being the normative view that the purpose of the corporation
is to maximize value for the shareholders. Second, microeconomics,
with its emphases on efficiency and maximization, can be deployed to
serve an allocatively sensitive description of corporate governance,
providing a more capacious methodological tent than anyone on
corporate law theretofore had understood. Third, it is not only possible
but arguably necessary to take corporate law seriously when
articulating a microeconomic theory of corporate production. To the
extent an economic model’s description of the appropriate legal
framework differs materially from the inherited legal framework, there
is a possible, even a probable, infirmity in the model.
Despite all of this, the TPM did not achieve paradigmatic
dominance or even general acceptance as a useful alternative
perspective. This is because corporate legal theory is not at bottom
about descriptive accuracy or methodological correctness. It is, above
all, responsive to normative concerns. The academic community’s
equivocal reception of the TPM demonstrates the depth of its
commitment to the norm that corporate managers be held accountable
for their exercises of the power to direct the business and its continued
view that corporate law fails to adequately assure accountability. The
TPM stands for a contrasting, contractarian proposition—that market
and legal constraints adequately (if not perfectly) control managers and
that the salient normative concern is the encouragement of firm-specific
investment. The choice between the two perspectives is a judgment call,
an exercise likely to be influenced heavily by ideological preferences. It
thus is not Blair and Stout’s fault that the wider community did not
accept their model’s normative invitation, however well made.
Meanwhile, no one knows what the future may bring. As more and more
power accretes to shareholders, a converse accountability problem
becomes more and more salient. An adjustment of academic views
remains a distinct possibility.
This Article expands on this evaluation of the TPM.
Part I is preparatory, describing the theoretical landscape onto
which Blair and Stout intervened. The presentation covers a
considerable stretch of historical territory, sketching the evolution of
corporate legal theory from the postwar period through the end of the
twentieth century. It is, for the most part, a story of shareholder
primacy and agency relationships in theory and shareholder travails
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and excessive agency costs in practice, but not entirely. There is also
recessive managerialist strain, a strain reinvigorated by the TPM.
Part II recounts in detail the TPM as described in Blair and
Stout’s 1999 article. The discussion begins with the model’s economic
assertions, then traces its antecedents in economic literature, and turns
finally to the relation of mutual support between the economic TPM and
the structural inheritance of corporate law.
Part III reconsiders the TPM as economics, as contractarianism,
as legal doctrine, and as history.
I. CONTEXT
This Article claims that Blair and Stout made a great
contribution by filling gaps in the dispensation of corporate law and
economics. To sustain the claim, that preexisting dispensation needs to
be described. This Part fills in this historical background.
The account starts by turning the clock back to the era before
the arrival of law and economics, picking up with the period from 1945
to the early 1970s. This is the time when corporate management
enjoyed a great deal of prestige and microeconomic theory had little to
say about the internal operation of corporations. The timeline moves
forward to the economic strains of the 1970s, when perspectives and
evaluations changed markedly. There was an antimanagerial backlash
accompanied by the beginning of corporate governance as we now know
it and the appearance of agency theory in microeconomics. Agency
theory introduces shareholder primacy as a function of economic
analysis. During the 1980s and 1990s, it spawned two contrasting lines
of legal theory. One line depicts corporations as entirely ancillary and
subject to market forces, subsuming both the organizations and the
corporate law framework into a picture of market discipline. A
contrasting and more widely accepted approach bemoans the absence
of market control of management power and goes on to problematize
the legal framework, recommending law reform toward the end of
realizing shareholder primacy in practice as well as in theory.
A. Managerialism and Antimanagerialism
1. The Managerialist Era
The first exhaustive diagnosis of the management accountability
problem appeared during the depths of the Depression with the
publication of Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means’s The Modern
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Corporation and Private Property. 7 Berle and Means described a
separation of ownership and control—the shareholders owned but could
not control, due to dispersed holdings and resulting collective action
problems. Managers accordingly wielded considerable power in the
economy and the polity without the wholesome accountability that
befalls a property owner. 8
Management unaccountability would remain a central and
constant question in academic corporate law. But, at least during the
quarter century that followed World War II, the edge of policy concern
was much softened. Corporate managers enjoyed great prestige as the
successful planners of an expanding economy. 9 Most observers agreed
that management power ineluctably flowed from organizational
expertise and that structural impediments foreclosed the possibility of
putting hierarchical firms under market control. 10 Few bemoaned the
apparent absence of market constraints; based on the experience of the
Great Depression, most people thought of markets as prone to fail in
any event.
The microeconomics of the day supported the point.
Microeconomic theory focuses on markets, and, prior to the mid-1970s,
economists tended to situate large corporations outside of markets and
to theorize about the line of division between the two. The earliest
exercise in drawing a line between market coordination and production
in firms came from Ronald Coase in a famous essay published in 1937. 11
Coase posited that if markets held out a framework conducive to
complex production, then actors could be expected to produce based on
individual transactions in markets, and firms would not exist. But firms
did exist, and production occurred in firms. For an explanation, Coase
looked to transaction costs. Production through individual market
contracts would be too expensive, for organizing production through the
price mechanism meant incurring the cost of ascertaining the prices; 12
furthermore, long-term relationships would be difficult to sustain. 13
7.
BERLE & MEANS, supra note 2, at 1 (noting that economic power had concentrated in the
hands of corporate managers and that the corporate system amounted to a major social
institution).
8.
Id. at 1–2, 4–5, 7–9, 13–35.
9.
ADOLPH A. BERLE, THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REPUBLIC 83, 89–91 (1963) (describing an
“American economic republic” in which the state and the economy are interdependent, with the
state taking ultimate responsibility for economic results and exercising the higher level of power).
10. See William W. Bratton, Jr., The “Nexus of Contracts” Corporation: A Critical Appraisal,
74 CORNELL L. REV. 407, 413 (1989) (describing management’s power over the processes of
production and distribution, its control over hierarchical bureaucracies, and its imposition of
externalities on those outside the entities).
11. R. H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937).
12. Id. at 390.
13. Id. at 391–92.
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Hierarchical structure reduces these costs, facilitating complex
economic endeavor by turning coordination over to an entrepreneur. 14
Management empowerment, while problematic, was unavoidable
because the markets were intrinsically incapable of providing an
environment conducive to complex production.
The accountability problem identified by Berle and Means still
followed. But during the postwar era Berle himself pronounced the
problem to have been solved. In Berle’s view, the post–New Deal
regulatory state adequately controlled managers’ behavior and kept
them responsive to constituent demands. 15 He simultaneously
dismissed dispersed shareholders as having no positive governance
contribution to make. 16 They played their only economic role as wealthy
consumers. They supported their families, they supported social welfare
programs as taxpayers, and they supported charities as donors. 17
As such they were entitled to society’s thanks, but not its
political solicitude.
It was an environment in which corporate law fell back from the
policy margin. Indeed, it came to be viewed as a backwater. In 1962,
Bayless Manning, one of the era’s prominent corporate law academics,
pronounced corporate law dead as a field of intellectual effort, a dry-asdust doctrinal inheritance lacking in policy salience. 18 No
reinvigorating reference over to microeconomics would be made until
the late 1970s.
2. Reversal of Fortune
The managerialist era ended abruptly when the economic bill for
the Vietnam War came due in 1972 and 1973. The stock market
collapsed, and the economy went into a severe recession aggravated by

14. Id. at 392.
15. BERLE, supra note 9, at 99, 169 (noting that the state intervened only to stabilize the
organizational lines and performance of private producers and that managers, in order to keep the
state at bay, were forced to keep the public satisfied with jobs and growth). Thus constrained,
managers amounted to quasi-civil servants. Id. at 89–90. Berle’s description had a theoretical
counterpart in JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE (1967), which leaves the
competing groups free to make their own rules, subject to government intervention to assure that
excessive power does not accrue to one group.
16. Adolf Berle, Property, Production and Revolution: A Preface to the Revised Edition of
ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY, at
xxiii (rev. ed. 1967).
17. See BERLE, supra note 9, at 51–53 (discussing welfare by the state and community).
18. Bayless Manning, The Shareholder’s Appraisal Remedy: An Essay for Frank Coker, 72
YALE L.J. 223, 245 n.37 (1962) (“[C]orporation law, as a field of intellectual effort, is dead in the
United States.”).
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the mid-east oil crisis. 19 The appearance of international competition in
manufactured goods added to a growing list of chronic problems. 20 The
stock market did not really recover until August of 1982—a whole
decade in which there was no money to be made investing long-term in
equities even as inflation rose steeply. The malaise, called “stagflation,”
undermined the economic assumptions of the managerialist era. 21
People started to ask questions about how well managers were doing
their jobs, 22 questions that began with the sudden collapse of the
once-great Penn Central Railroad in 1970 23 and intensified as bad
results accumulated.
The conceptual framework surrounding corporations changed
substantially as a result. The happy story of managers as capable
technocrats who enhance social welfare under the watchful eye of the
big-stick state no longer resonated. Unbridled management power came
back to the forefront as a problem in need of solution, and “corporate
governance” was invented to tackle the job. 24 The first fully developed
text on the subject, Melvin Eisenberg’s The Structure of the
Corporation, 25 appeared in 1976. Eisenberg synthesized and materially
advanced a generation of thinking about the deficiencies of the
corporation’s received legal model. 26 For a corrective mechanism, he
turned to the board of directors, theretofore thought to be a moribund
institution. 27 If we scaled down the demands we placed on it and
successfully required it to monitor management performance (as
opposed to taking a leadership role in hands-on management),
corporate performance would improve. 28 The monitoring function in
turn required independent directors and a committee structure keyed
to monitoring functions. 29 The approach caught on quickly. The
independent board became so salient as to become a target of
19. GERALD F. DAVIS, THE
OF A NEW ECONOMY 47 (2016).
20.
21.
22.
23.

VANISHING AMERICAN CORPORATION: NAVIGATING THE HAZARDS

Id. at 55–56.
Id. at 55.
Id. at 56.
See STAFF REP. OF THE SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N TO THE H.R. SPECIAL SUBCOMM. ON
INVESTIGATIONS, 92D CONG., THE FINANCIAL COLLAPSE OF THE PENN CENTRAL COMPANY 170–72
(Subcomm. Print 1972) (discussing the fall of the Penn Central Railroad).
24. The phrase “corporate governance” had its first published appearance only in 1972. See
Mariana Pargendler, The Corporate Governance Obsession, 42 J. CORP. L. 359, 373–375 (2016)
(“[T]he New York Times featured the phrase as early as 1972.”).
25. See EISENBERG, supra note 3, at 162–70. Eisenberg’s monitoring model of the board of
directors has ever since been the main focus of legal corporate governance.
26. See id. at 139–85 (discussing additional rules and structure for corporate governance).
27. See id. (discussing additional structure for board of directors and management).
28. See id. at 156–57 (discussing the function of the board of directors).
29. See id. at 162–68 (emphasizing the monitoring function of the board).
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management capture: The Business Roundtable, seeking to stave off
more intrusive initiatives then in circulation, publicly embraced the
independent director majority in 1978. 30
Corporate law was back at the policy margin.
B. Agency Theory and Contractarianism
The 1970s stagflation also undermined confidence in the
regulatory state. People were ready to return their trust to markets. A
second text published in 1976, Michael Jensen and William Meckling’s
Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership
Structure, was there to greet them. 31
Jensen and Meckling’s principal-agent model tells a corporate
creation story in which the only problem confronting the firm is
management moral hazard, which causes agency costs. It is a partial
equilibrium set-up: but for management moral hazard and
shareholders’ and managers’ arrangements in respect thereof, all other
things are equal and efficient. Hence, the entire focus is on the
shareholder-manager relationship.
In the model, agency costs are reduced to the extent that
managers find it cost effective to incur bonding costs and investors find
it cost effective to incur monitoring costs. 32 A possibility is held open
that contracting between managers and investors will yield further cost
reductive results, contracting that occurs at the moment a foundermanager conducts an initial public offering (“IPO”) and creates a public
corporation. 33 The model does not predict that bonding, monitoring, and
contracting will reduce agency costs to zero—residual agency costs that
cannot be cost-effectively eliminated will persist as an intrinsic cost of
production. 34 The persistent residuum is unproblematic because, in the
model, the equity trading market allocates these costs to the foundermanager at the moment of creation. 35 All of this had a surprising

30. See Bus. Roundtable, Statement, The Role and Composition of the Board of Directors of
the Large Publicly Owned Corporation, 33 BUS. LAW. 2083, 2092–93 (1978) (proposing reforms to
encourage more independent directors). Skeptics took the view that management capture was the
end in view: so long as incumbent CEOs could use their influence to secure appointment of
cooperative types, any threat was minimal. See Victor Brudney, The Independent Director—
Heavenly City or Potemkin Village?, 95 HARV. L. REV. 597, 610–12 (1982) (describing the pattern
of cooperation and management control of appointments).
31. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
32. Id. at 323–26.
33. Id. at 319–23.
34. Id. at 327.
35. Id. at 313, 318–19.
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implication: between markets and contracts, the main problems
addressed in corporate law were being solved.
The principal-agent model minimizes the importance of
authority and hierarchy in the description of corporate production,
redirecting our attention to contracts between the managers and
outside providers of equity capital. The shift of perspective deflects the
Coasian theory of the firm, making it possible to show that private
ordering in capital markets works effectively to discipline corporate
governance. More particularly, market trading prices management
moral hazard and allocates its cost. And, in cases where markets do not
work, private contracting comes to the fore to solve any problems. 36 The
Coasian production hierarchy has not exactly disappeared. It just no
longer matters.
The model incorporates shareholder primacy, but as an
assumption rather than as a result. It assumes that all parties
connected to the firm other than the shareholders and managers
already possess complete, maximizing contracts and that, as between
managers and shareholders, management moral hazard is the sole
source of contractual incompleteness. 37 From this, it automatically
follows that whatever minimizes the effects of moral hazard
automatically maximizes both shareholder return and overall welfare.
Meanwhile, the model assumes away everything in corporate
governance other than the management-shareholder conflict of
interest, manager-shareholder contracting with respect thereto, and
the stock market’s ability to price out the conflict.
This spare microeconomic model held out a blank canvas on
which legal theorists could paint in descriptions suited to their
normative priors. Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel did just that,
turning what is implicit in the model into a sequence of normative
assertions for legal contexts. 38 This “contractarian” restatement
mightily expanded the model’s field of application.
36. Note that the authority structures in firms do not disappear. There is instead a change
in the characterization of what it means to be a hierarchical inferior. For Coase, this implied a
sacrifice of liberty that required explanation. For Jensen and Meckling, the hierarchical inferior is
a contract counterparty who can always walk away. Id. at 310–11. Jensen and Meckling here
repeat a point made earlier by Alchian and Demsetz. Firms, said the latter pair, have “no power
of fiat, no authority, no disciplinary action[.] [They do not differ] in the slightest degree from
ordinary market contracting between any two people.” Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz,
Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777, 777 (1972).
37. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 31, at 312–18, 326.
38. The arbitrage was effected in a series of articles. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel
R. Fischel, Close Corporations and Agency Costs, 38 STAN. L. REV. 271 (1986); Frank H.
Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1416 (1989)
[hereinafter Easterbook & Fischel, Contract]; Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited
Liability and the Corporation, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 89 (1985); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R.
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The Easterbrook and Fischel model quietly relaxes the model’s
limiting assumptions to accommodate the real-world corporate
governance framework. The “contract” grows. It is now not just the
result of face-to-face bargaining at the moment the public firm is
created through an IPO but also corporate law itself and internal
corporate legislation enacted over time. 39 The model also expands the
set of market controls of agency costs. In addition to stock market
pricing, it relies on the market for corporate control (also known as
hostile takeovers), the product markets, and executive labor markets.
The four markets operate together to assure agency-cost minimization
on a multi-period basis. 40
Two broad claims about corporate law follow. First, there should
be a presumption against having any more corporate law than already
exists. Because rational actors arrange governance in contracts and
markets price the contract terms, legal mandates are justifiable only in
the unlikely event that “the terms chosen by firms are both unpriced
and systematically perverse from investors’ standpoints.” 41 Second,
the inherited corporate law regime is economically rational, 42
justifying a strong normative presumption in its favor. The two
claims, taken together, ratified corporate law’s status quo, a natural
result in a framework asserting the evolutionary dominance of
maximizing arrangements.
Easterbrook and Fischel’s arbitrage of economic agency to legal
policy was controversial and never gained ascendance in all particulars.
The sticking point was the capacious notion of contract, which
encompasses all interactions between managers, investors, consumers,
and the government in a multi-period, dynamic setting that features
few actual negotiations. 43 Microeconomics does not go nearly this far in
describing contracts. Its only addition to out-of-market exchange by

Fischel, Optimal Damages in Securities Cases, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 611 (1985). The initial crossreference occurred in Daniel R. Fischel, Efficient Capital Market Theory, the Market for Corporate
Control, and the Regulation of Cash Tender Offers, 57 TEX. L. REV. 1, 8–9 (1978).
39. Easterbrook & Fischel, Contract, supra note 38, at 1429–31.
40. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 4, at 4, 18–21, 91, 93, 96–97. Reliance on a market
triad (control, product, and employment) to control management antedates Easterbrook and
Fischel’s arbitrage of Jensen and Meckling. See Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder
Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUDS. 251, 262–70 (1977).
41. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 4, at 21. Easterbrook and Fischel make a strong
claim for institutional primacy for the market price without also making a claim for strong market
price efficiency. Id. at 18–19.
42. Id. at 315.
43. See Easterbrook & Fischel, Contract, supra note 38, at 1428–34.
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direct negotiation is a category of “relational” contracts, 44 a category not
nearly big enough to fill the category devised under contractarianism.
The question was whether the territory of “contract,” with its
arm’s-length bargains and equally situated parties, plausibly covered
the entire ground swept in by Easterbrook and Fischel’s contractarian
firm, much of which was manifestly hierarchical in character and
displayed persistent accountability problems at the top. The consensus
answer was that contractual characterization was insufficiently
robust to justify turning corporate law into a thoroughgoing default
regime—fiduciary duties would have to remain mandatory because
proxy voting was not a process context suited to effective
noncompetitive transacting. 45
Still, even with only partial acceptance, the contractarian
paradigm precipitated fundamental changes in the way people view
corporate law. Henceforth, policy discussions would proceed in a
microeconomic
framework
dominated
by
two
normative
presumptions—a presumption disfavoring new regulatory initiatives to
control management and entity behavior and a presumption favoring
private contracting and market control.
C. The Shareholder Paradigm
Easterbrook and Fischel’s work appeared even as the hostile
takeovers of the 1980s assailed managers and transformed corporate
law. The takeovers imported credibility to their novel perspective.
Easterbrook and Fischel, by folding the market for corporate control
into Jensen and Meckling’s moral hazard account, produced a neat
explanation of what was going on in the real world: moral hazard had
caused agency costs to run to excess, and discounted stock prices
reflected the value impairment. The discounts in turn attracted control
bidders by assuring an arbitrage profit, with the market-based control
transfer performing a critical agency cost reductive role. 46 An account
44. See Jonathan Levin, Relational Incentive Contracts, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 835, 835–36
(2003).
45. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., No Exit?: Opting Out, the Contractual Theory of the
Corporation, and the Special Case of Remedies, 53 BROOK. L. REV. 919, 924 (1988) (arguing that
corporate adoption of contract law makes opting out of default rules difficult); Jeffrey N. Gordon,
The Mandatory Structure of Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1549, 1574–80 (1989) (discussing
the drawbacks to shareholder voting rights); John C. Coffee, Jr., The Mandatory/Enabling
Balance in Corporate Law: An Essay on the Judicial Role, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1618, 1619–20 (1989)
(arguing for judicial involvement in contracting); Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Structure of
Corporation Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1461, 1462–63, 1486–89 (1989).
46. Viewed retrospectively, Jensen and Meckling’s theory is unlikely to be satisfactory as a
standalone explanation for 1980s takeovers—the empirical profile holds out a much richer
collection of causative factors. See, e.g., Robert Comment & G. William Schwert, Poison or Placebo?
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based on market control suddenly seemed plausible. The takeover boom
denuded management of insulation from market pressure,
demonstrating the power and transformative potential of capital
market inputs for the first time since the early twentieth century. The
takeovers also brought forward shareholders as the primary corporate
constituents, ushering in a new era of solicitude of their interests.
Easterbrook and Fischel put agency theory at their service.
The takeovers ceased in the wake of the economic collapse of
1989 and then failed to restart in tandem with economic recovery a
couple of years later. A public choice story circulated to explain this, 47
ascribing the takeover’s diminished salience to higher regulatory
barriers. It followed that a takeover-centric view of corporate
governance remained appropriate: takeovers were deemed an essential
means to the end of agency cost reduction long after they disappeared
in the real world. 48 It also followed that in the post-takeover era, agency
costs were chronically and suboptimally high.
A reformulation of the contractarian paradigm naturally
followed. Contractarianism had borrowed the microeconomics of the
principal-agent model to describe highly successful private ordering, a
story that lost plausibility once nefarious managers and corrupt
politicians choked off the leading market control. It followed that
private ordering could not by itself assure an efficient governance
system. The adjusted account retained the principal-agent model’s
exclusive focus on management moral hazard along with an
information-efficient account of stock market pricing. But now, instead
of a contracting field conducive to efficient self-correction, we had a field
riven with collective action problems, path dependencies, and other

Evidence on the Deterrence and Wealth Effects of Modern Antitakeover Measures, 39 J. FIN. ECON.
3, 29 (1995) (looking at a range of factors—including ownership, abnormal return, sales growth,
leverage, Tobin’s q ratio, market to book value ratio, and size—to predict the likelihood that a firm
will become a hostile target and finding that size is the only consistently successful predictor);
Mark L. Mitchell & J. Harold Mulherin, The Impact of Industry Shocks on Takeover and
Restructuring Activity, 41 J. FIN. ECON. 193, 195–96 (1996) (observing that mergers come in waves
and focus on specific industries).
47. Roberta Romano, The Future of Hostile Takeovers: Legislation and Public Opinion, 57 U.
CIN. L. REV. 457, 457 (1988) (Managers seeking renewed insulation from the markets went to state
legislatures and appealed to state judiciaries to promote antitakeover statutes and otherwise
validate takeover defensive measures.).
48. See Guhan Subramanian, A New Takeover Defense Mechanism: Using an Equal
Treatment Agreement as an Alternative to the Poison Pill, 23 DEL. J. CORP. L. 375, 383, 397 (1998);
Comment & Schwert, supra note 46, at 5, 28, 33 (Large-sample evidence “provides little support
for the proposition that modern antitakeover measures have been used to deter takeovers
systematically.”).
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failures. 49 There is no generally accepted label for this perspective. For
convenience, it will be referred to here as the “shareholder paradigm.”
Regulation came back into the picture as a result, but for the
limited purpose of adjusting the corporate process framework so that
market control could work in fact and finally get us to the partial
equilibrium result posited at the start by Jensen and Meckling.
Shareholders should exercise “ultimate control” of the firm, 50 but were
not doing so. Corporate governance needed positive-law reforms to
bring this about. 51 Removal of anti-takeover barriers not being
politically feasible, the policy agenda looked toward “shareholder
empowerment” more generally. Management needed to be forced to
yield to shareholder inputs on governance and business planning on a
going concern basis. That information asymmetries might impair the
quality of any shareholder inputs was not deemed to be a salient
problem, for a market-based performance metric was available—the
stock price. 52 Everything in corporate governance thereby came down
to a single real-world instruction—manage to maximize the market
price of the stock.
D. Shareholder Primacy
Shareholder primacy is a tie that binds together Jensen and
Meckling’s model, Easterbrook and Fischel’s contractarianism, and the
shareholder paradigm. Recall that in Jensen and Meckling, it operates
at the level of an assumption: if we model the firm as a nexus of
complete contracts among all parties involved while modeling the
contract between a firm and its shareholders as incomplete (in that the
shareholders claim the residual return after all other contractual
claims have been met), maximization of shareholder value

49. See, e.g., Mark J. Roe, Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics, 109 HARV. L. REV.
641, 644–45 (1996) (outlining how path-dependent histories lead to missed modern adaptations);
see also Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Mark J. Roe, A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate Ownership
and Governance, 52 STAN. L. REV. 127, 161–62 (1999) (arguing that contracting around mandatory
rules is unrealistically costly—or even impossible).
50. Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO.
L.J. 439, 440–41 (2001).
51. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L.
REV. 833, 865–70 (2005) (recommending expansion of shareholder legislative access to the
corporate charter and the state of incorporation decision); Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of the
Shareholder Franchise, 93 VA. L. Rev. 675, 700–01 (2007) (recommending a right to replace all
incumbents every two or three years).
52. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 50, at 440–41.
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automatically follows as the economically efficient result. 53 The
assumption’s plausibility depends entirely on the model of constituent
contracts: if all contracts other than the shareholders’ are complete and
embody a maximizing trade for each party, then maximizing the
shareholders’ residual return does maximize value for all concerned.
The problem is that no one thinks that, in the real world, other
stakeholders enter into complete contracts.
To surmount this problem, shareholder primacy’s proponents
make a two-part robustness case. The first part is a fallback claim for
shareholder entitlement in a world in which incomplete contracts are
ubiquitous: relatively speaking, the shareholder’s contract holds out
less in the way of protection than do the other constituents’ contracts.
Employees can look to alternative employment at their opportunity
wage in competitive labor markets, and creditors can take security or
shorten their maturities, while shareholders’ capital is locked in for an
indefinite duration with their only further protection stemming from
governance arrangements. A claim to pride of place in the legal model
follows from the diagnosis of relative vulnerability. 54
The second part of the case references alternatives to a
shareholder maxim and finds them wanting. The argument proceeds in
two phases. It is first asserted that decisionmaking costs should be
minimized. This in turn implies a limitation on the number of
constituents referenced in the firm’s objective function. 55 Multiconstituent models invite incoherence due to conflict amongst the
interests referenced. Incoherence in turn expands the scope of
management discretion, potentially increasing management agency
costs. 56 Second, the shareholders are the best reference point among the
available constituents. As they hold the residual claim, managing in
their interest maximizes returns for the corporation as a whole. 57
Moreover, their capital investment in the residual lends them an
undiluted, purely financial incentive to maximize the firm’s value. 58
From an incentive point of view, they contrast favorably against
53. Marco Becht, Patrick Bolton & Ailsa Röell, Corporate Governance and Control 8–9 (Eur.
Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 02/2002, 2005), http://ssrn.com/abs=343461
[https://perma.cc/QMU5-PMMS].
54. See Oliver Williamson, Corporate Governance, 93 YALE L.J. 1197, 1210–11, 1227–29
(1984) (describing shareholders as having a unique position as regards the firm).
55. Becht et al., supra note 53, at 9.
56. See Michael C. Jensen, Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate
Objective Function, 14 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 8, 9, 13 (2001) (“Stakeholder theory directs corporate
managers to serve ‘many masters.’ And, to paraphrase the old adage, when there are many
masters, all end up being shortchanged.”).
57. See, e.g., Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 50, at 449.
58. Id.
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managers and independent directors, whose incentives are comprised
by interests in compensation and job retention, and against other
constituents, whose contractual interests exclude the residual upside. 59
II. THE MODEL
Blair and Stout intervened just as the shareholder paradigm
emerged as corporate law’s consensus view. Their TPM challenged the
consensus by widening the descriptive lens. Where the agency models
look only at the shareholder-management contract, the TPM looks at
the contracts between the corporation and all capital providers, both
financial and human. Where agency models look for value enhancement
only through agency-cost reduction, the TPM looks to the production
side to encourage firm-specific investment. The TPM also deemphasizes
market control, reviving the Coasian stress on hierarchical
relationships independent of markets.
This Part describes the model. In Section II.A, it outlines the
economic assertions, including a look at the economic literature from
which the model draws. Section II.B reviews the model’s innovative
treatment of the corporate law inheritance.
A. Economics
1. Outline
The TPM explains the corporation’s legal framework by
reference to the production function, which is said to require the
investment and coordinated effort of the multiple individuals and
groups that make up a team. The investments are firm specific—they
cannot be pulled back out and are nonseparable, which means that
valuable project attributes cannot be traced back to individual inputs. 60
A contractibility problem results. If, once a project gets underway, there
is no way to connect the inputs of team members to particular project
returns, there is no way to draft an ex ante contract that specifies an ex
post division of the economic surpluses generated by the project (termed
“rents”). The contract is going to have to specify an allocation ex ante or
establish a process that effectuates an allocation ex post.

59. For a caveat, see Bengt Holmstrom & Steven N. Kaplan, Corporate Governance and
Merger Activity in the United States: Making Sense of the 1980s and 1990s, 15 J. ECON. PERSPS.
121, 138 (2001) (suggesting that market shareholders have an advantage in moving capital from
declining to rising industries but that managers and employees have decisive expertise as regards
technologies, products, and processes).
60. Blair & Stout, supra note 1, at 249.
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Suppose the participants draft ex ante a formula that fixes
returns ex post. This solution invites slacking off—a team member with
a pre-set return has an incentive to take a free ride, reducing their
capital contribution given imperfect monitoring and information
asymmetries. Now assume instead that the team proceeds without a
pre-set allocative scheme or governance regime, deferring the matter
for ex post negotiation. This invites opportunistic rent-seeking, a
debilitating scenario that dissipates the project’s positive returns. 61 It
follows, say Blair and Stout, that the allocative problem is
noncontractible. To make team production work, the team members
must consent in advance to a governance structure—an organizational
design that provides a confidence-inspiring means of effecting ex post
allocations of rents. 62
At this point, Blair and Stout give us their creation story. The
team members, who include providers of financial capital as well as
providers of human capital, give up their property rights in their capital
inputs and their rights to returns from the firm’s output to a corporate
entity. The corporation is in turn governed by a mediating hierarchy,
which coordinates inputs, allocates proceeds, and mediates disputes.
The corporation’s board of directors sits at the hierarchy’s peak. Its
members are neither owners nor agents. Instead, they are trustees for
the benefit of the corporate entity, 63 representing the interests of all
team members and not just of the shareholders. 64
The board wields absolute power over the entity’s assets and,
importantly, must be independent of the individuals and groups in the
team. 65 Thus described, the board’s function is not to reduce agency
costs of management but to encourage firm-specific investment. The
board’s job is to protect team members’ investments, whether of
financial or human capital, rather than to maximize shareholder
value. 66 It follows that the board cannot be under the control of either
the shareholders or the other stakeholders 67 and that shareholder value

61. Id.
62. Id. at 250.
63. Id. at 280–81.
64. Id. at 286.
65. Id. at 251. The TPM’s description does not imply hands on management by the board.
Most production decisions are made down the hierarchical line through the collegial interaction of
team members, who have every incentive to solve their own problems (including allocational
problems) and keep the board at a distance. The board is more of a final authority, held in reserve
for resolution of intractable problems. Id. at 282.
66. Id. at 253.
67. Id. at 254.

1556

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74:6:1539

enhancement should not be held out as the purpose of the
public corporation. 68
Two additional specifications should be mentioned, one going to
agency costs and the other to allocative outcomes. There is no prediction
that agency costs will be reduced to zero. Although the board is
independent, perfect incentive incompatibility should not be expected,
given small capital stakes and rational self-interest. At the same time,
team membership does not imply a right to a particular share of
proceeds. The members are incented to stay on the team so long as
individual gains from the overall arrangement exceed the foregone costs
of slacking off and rent seeking. 69 Disparate allocations can occur given
large returns, allocations subject to the politics of the moment. 70
Blair and Stout, summing up, describe the TPM as a second-best
solution to a problem that resists an optimal solution. 71
2. Derivation
The TPM is original. As such, it differs from most law and
economics, which gets its theory by means of cross-disciplinary
arbitrage based on a completed analysis. But the TPM also has deep
roots in the microeconomic literature.
Blair and Stout explain why the usual arbitrage is not an option.
They divide the field of economic theory of the firm into two schools,
agency and property rights, neither of which, they tell us, gets it right.
Agency theory, with its focus on delegations from principals to agents
and exclusive stress on agency cost reduction, 72 fails to see the
principal-agent contract as a two-way street. The problems do not lie
exclusively with slacking and self-dealing by the agent at the principal’s
expense. The agent might in turn have problems getting the principal
to perform her end of the deal. 73 Property rights theory, in contrast,
problematizes incomplete contracting amongst firm participants and
fills the void by assigning property rights, also known as control, to a
participant, usually the equity holder. 74 Here the problem lies in the
68. Id. at 253.
69. Id. at 283.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 284.
72. Id. at 258–59.
73. Id. at 259.
74. Id. at 259–60 (citing, inter alia, Oliver D. Hart, Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of
the Firm, 4 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 119 (1988); Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, The Costs and
Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration, 94 J. POL. ECON. 691, 693
(1986); Oliver Hart & John Moore, Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm, 98 J. POL. ECON.
1119, 1120 (1990)).
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transition to the context of corporate law, which does not vest
shareholders with a property right to control. 75
Blair and Stout then accurately describe the result of the
arbitrage of these economic observations to corporate legal theory. The
microeconomics of agency and property rights are fused into a single
convergent description of the corporation. This depicts a top-down firm
hierarchy with the shareholders at the top, delegating authority to the
board, which delegates on to the top officers and so on down the line. 76
Thus modeled, the firm’s only problem lies in assuring optimal
performance by the delegee-agents.
A more cogent model, say Blair and Stout, eliminates the
shareholder principal and shifts attention from vertical relationships in
the hierarchy to the horizontal relationships of team members. They
build on the assertion by drawing three notions from the existing
literature: (1) that production calls for teamwork, (2) that allocational
problems among providers of capital are debilitating, and (3) that
monitoring and allocational functions are best vested in a neutral,
rather than in a capital provider. 77
Blair and Stout extract a definition of team production from
Alchian and Demsetz’s 1972 model. 78 But they otherwise keep their
distance, and for good reason. Alchian and Demsetz solve the teamproduction problem with a monitor who employs all other team
members under complete market contracts, dispensing with
hierarchical power relationships. 79 The model is the earliest exemplar
of a model of the firm operated through market contracting. In the
history of theory of the firm, it holds a place as a precursor 80 to Jensen
and Meckling.
Blair and Stout then turn to property rights models, drilling
down on Bengt Holmstrom’s 1982 model of contractual incompleteness
in a production context. 81 Holmstrom attempted to model a monitoring
arrangement that simultaneously controlled shirking under
asymmetric information and allocated proceeds. He did not succeed,
with the model’s interest lying in its explanation of the reasons for its
own failure. The lesson was that an ex ante allocation triggered
75. Blair & Stout, supra note 1, at 260.
76. Id. at 262–63 (terming this the “grand-design principal-agent model”).
77. Id. at 264–69.
78. Id. at 265–66 (quoting Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 36, at 779) (“In [their] paper,
[Alchian & Demsetz] defined team production as ‘production in which 1) several types of resources
are used . . . 2) the product is not a sum of separable outputs of each cooperating resource . . . [and]
3) not all resources used in team production belong to one person.’ ”).
79. Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 36, at 778, 781–82.
80. Bratton, supra note 10, at 415.
81. Bengt Holmstrom, Moral Hazard in Teams, 13 BELL J. ECON. 324, 324–25 (1982).
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shirking, which could be punished only by an across-the-board
withholding of proceeds, which in turn led to opportunism on the
monitor’s part. The solution to the problem lay in a mechanism for an
incentive compatible outside monitor, 82 with Holmstrom suggesting
that outside shareholders in public companies might be viable
candidates for the job. 83
Holmstrom set the stage for Blair and Stout’s final move, for he
conjoined hierarchical monitoring and allocational problems and rent
seeking at the production level to present an unsolved, incomplete
contracting problem. Blair and Stout fold in the team notion to suggest
that team members have a mutual interest in minimizing shirking and
rent seeking and can solve their problem by transferring control to a
neutral third party, the mediating hierarch. 84 Here they draw support
from a Rajan and Zingales 85 model of two parties making a firm-specific
investment. The model shows that vesting control rights in either party
chills investment on both sides. It thus does not make sense to vest
control in the party with the most capital at stake. Better to find a third
party who makes no firm-specific investment, securing decision services
with a nominal slice of the project’s returns. 86
We reach Blair and Stout’s bottom line at this point: rational
team members submit to hierarchical control not for the hierarch’s
benefit, but for their own. 87 Providers of human and financial capital
need a hierarch to perform the function of gathering information and to
monitor against shirking. 88 But they cannot assume the role of
hierarchical principals themselves. They accordingly give up their
property rights in their capital to an economically neutral
decisionmaking process, 89 a process that encourages cooperation and
firm-specific investment. 90
B. Law
The TPM is unique in drawing on the legal inheritance as an
affirmative input in an economic model of the firm. Elsewhere in the
law and economics literature, the economic model comes first, with the
82. Blair & Stout, supra note 1, at 268–69.
83. Holmstrom, supra note 81, at 338–39.
84. Blair & Stout, supra note 1, at 271.
85. Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, Power in a Theory of the Firm, 113 Q.J. ECON. 387,
392 (1998).
86. Id. at 422.
87. Blair & Stout, supra note 1, at 274.
88. Id. at 278.
89. Id. at 285.
90. Id. at 277.
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theorist then laying it on top of the legal model, claiming consonance
where plausible but, given dissonance, asserting that economic analysis
highlights a legal infirmity. The TPM, in contrast, looks to the legal
model for inspiration, in particular its provision of a board of directors
without a principal. Blair and Stout simultaneously draw on the law to
support the model’s economic description and draw on the model’s
economics to explicate the law.
The legal inheritance does, in fact, yield deep support for the
TPM. Corporate boards exercise “original and undelegated” powers. 91
To file a charter and incorporate is to untap a direct delegation of
authority from the state to the corporate board to do business, authority
that vests before the issuance of any shares. 92 Voting power to select
board members is indeed vested in the shareholders. 93 But this grant
does not give the shareholders the power to issue management
instructions to the board. 94 Absent such a power, there is no agency
relationship—period. An analogy to the legal relations of trustees and
beneficiaries works much better. But, even given a shift over to a trust
model, corporate law imposes no duty on director-trustees to maximize
for the shareholders. Instead, directors owe their fiduciary duties to the
corporate entity. In Blair and Stout’s description, they are independent
hierarchs who pursue the “interests of the corporation,” which they
further describe as “a joint welfare function of all the individuals who
make firm-specific investments and agree to participate in the
extracontractual, internal mediation process within the firm.” 95
Blair and Stout take this legal structure and run with it. They
show us that it is not some hoary conceptual inheritance that can be
dispensed with as we modernize to a principal-agent framework. In
their picture, corporate fiduciary law assimilates the structure and
carries it to a logical conclusion, according the board a protected zone
within which to make allocative decisions. 96 The zone of discretion
partly results from the operation of the business judgment rule, which
prevents litigating shareholders from second-guessing management
decisions gone wrong and partly results from the operation of the duty

91. See, e.g., People ex rel. Manice v. Powell, 94 N.E. 634, 637 (N.Y. 1911) (quoting Hoyt v.
Thompson’s Ex’r, 19 N.Y. 207, 216 (1859)).
92. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 102(a)(6), 108, 152 (2021) (The first things that happen upon
incorporation are the appointment of the board of directors and the approval of the bylaws; the
board then approves the terms of the issue of stock.).
93. Blair & Stout, supra note 1, at 291.
94. tit. 8, § 141(a) (The board manages the business unless the charter provides otherwise.).
95. Blair & Stout, supra note 1, at 288.
96. Id. at 298–309.
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of loyalty, which is sparing in its articulation of prohibited, selfinterested conduct on directors’ parts.
The duty of loyalty discussion is noteworthy. Blair and Stout
point out that even as self-dealing contracts can trigger a breach of the
duty, many actions that are manifestly self-interested escape
scrutiny. 97 Defensive measures against a hostile tender offer are a
leading example. 98 Investments and acquisitions that make the firm
bigger and safer for the benefit of internal constituents but at a sacrifice
of shareholder value are another. 99 Neither traverse the duty to the
corporation even as they manifestly injure the shareholders’ economic
interests. The fact that generations of academic colleagues have
excoriated these features of the fiduciary landscape does not bother
Blair and Stout. Far from it—one senses that they relish the exercise of
bringing disfavored cases and statutes into the center of an economic
theory of the corporation.
There are sticking points, of course. The shareholder derivative
action is one: shareholders are the only constituents with standing to
enforce fiduciary law against directors, a privilege implying fiduciary
beneficiary status. Blair and Stout push back against the implication
with expedient points, but the points are fair and add up. The
shareholders, they say, have standing not because they enjoy the
juridical status of beneficiaries but because, as the holders of residual
economic interest in the corporation’s returns, they are the constituents
best suited to take the enforcement role. 100 Their standing, moreover, is
contingent. Given insolvency, the creditors step into the economic shoes
of the residual interest holder, and litigation standing comes with it. 101
Meanwhile, procedural stumbling blocks work to assure that any
interventions by particular shareholders operate for the benefit of the
corporation as a whole, 102 as does the rule on damages, which channels
the proceeds of a judgment to the corporation’s bank account. 103
The other, even bigger sticking point, is shareholder voting,
which also implies beneficiary status. Blair and Stout deploy a similar
strategy against this implication. First comes a negative. Shareholder
voting rights are, in practice, so weak as not to implicate control; the
board, which controls the proxy solicitation process, in effect elects

97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Id. at 305–09.
Id. at 307–08.
Id. at 306–07.
Id. at 289.
Id. at 295–97.
Id. at 293–94.
Id. at 294–95.
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itself. 104 Two positives follow. The vote needs to be vested somewhere,
lest the board become a self-perpetuating oligarch. Shareholders, with
their interest in maximizing their shares’ value, are less likely to be
motivated by rent-seeking than are the competing stakeholder
groups. 105 Blair and Stout follow up by drawing on a prominent point in
the shareholder primacy case: compared to other stakeholders,
shareholders have a weak position when it comes to contracting into
slices of corporate pie. Managers and employees do their rent-seeking
on the inside. Public shareholders, in contrast, are outside and, thus
positioned, suffer from informational asymmetries and labor under an
intrinsic collective action problem. With voting rights, the legal model,
in effect, makes a giveback that evens their position vis-à-vis
interior stakeholders. 106
These treatments will not satisfy shareholder advocates, who
will insist that the points favoring shareholders be carried to a logical
conclusion. They look at the legal model and ask: “Who should be in and
who should be out?” The ins are the common shareholders, the preferred
shareholders (on limited fact patterns), and the creditors in the wake of
insolvency, and for the same reasons given by Blair and Stout in their
explanation of derivative standing and voting rights. All other
stakeholders are out and are not corporate law beneficiaries. Blair and
Stout, in contrast, get past this mode of thinking by reminding us that
the corporate entity is “in” first and foremost. This move expands the
beneficiary envelope and integrates the TPM and the inherited
legal model.
A follow up question arises: “Who is on the team and who is not?”
Blair and Stout leave the question unanswered—management,
employees, and common equity clearly are members; other stakeholders
like creditors and the local community may be members. 107 The
hesitancy is understandable. A long-term lender parts with capital that
is sunk into a firm-specific project, just as a purchaser of a share in an
IPO does. Yet while the shareholders get protective participatory
rights, the lenders have a near-complete contract negotiated at arm’s
length, inclusive of a power to extract the monetary value of the sunk
capital by force (and necessitating a costly defensive bankruptcy regime
in response). A capital contributor thus situated does not bear the
earmarks of a team member, as defined. A supplier of firm-specific
goods or a long-term, dependent customer whose account requires
104.
105.
106.
107.

Id. at 310–12.
Id. at 313 & n.175 (citing HANSMANN, supra note 6, at 97–98).
Id. at 314.
Id. at 253, 278.
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extensive servicing might make a more viable candidate but, depending
on the situation, need not. Outside of the core group, then, team
membership is fact dependent and left to the management of the
mediating hierarch. Blair and Stout are right to leave the point open.
C. Claims
Blair and Stout make several claims for the model. First, it
affords a “more appropriate basis” for understanding the functions
served by the public corporation than does the prevailing principalagent model of the firm. 108 Second, the model is “consistent with the
‘nexus of contracts’ approach to understanding corporate law.” 109 Third,
the model subsumes corporate law without dissonance, which similarly
should be seen as holding out a second-best solution to team production
problems. 110 The Part that follows takes up these claims, passing on the
first while confirming the second and third.
III. EVALUATION
Blair and Stout set themselves the task of articulating a model
of the public corporation that does three things simultaneously. First,
the model must be grounded in a microeconomic theory of the firm.
Second, the model must be consonant with the provisions and structure
of corporate law. Third, the model must situate the accomplishment of
productivity outside of the tent of shareholder primacy and market
control. Blair and Stout succeed at the task described, achieving closure
for their theory. Indeed, they did something that no one thought could
be done.
The discussion that follows expands on these observations. In so
doing, it does not address Blair and Stout’s first claim—the question
whether the TPM is correct (or more appropriate) in some sense that
renders agency theory incorrect (or less appropriate). 111 So to do is to
join a search for the firm’s essential nature and to draw exclusionary
lines around the descriptive essence, once established. 112 Such exercises

108. Id. at 250.
109. Id. at 254.
110. Id. at 250 & n.6 (citing Kelvin Lancaster & Richard G. Lipsey, The General Theory of the
Second Best, in TRADE, MARKETS AND WELFARE 193, 193–220 (Kelvin Lancaster ed., 1996)).
111. Or, alternatively, the question whether agency theory is correct (or more appropriate) in
some sense that renders the TPM incorrect (or less appropriate).
112. Blair and Stout do not make an explicit essentialist claim. But they at times gesture in
that direction, for example, when they claim that the board’s function is not to reduce agency costs
of management but to encourage firm-specific investment. See supra text accompanying note 66.
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can be insightful and have been executed with great analytical
facility. 113 Essentialist claiming and counterclaiming is an academic
pastime drawing many enthusiastic participants. It has a downside,
however. Essentialism means exclusion that, however convenient as a
prop to theoretical simplicity, 114 leads to inaccuracy. In legal contexts,
bad policy follows.
The discussion that follows is accordingly directed to a different
question. Agency has been and continues to be the dominant paradigm,
with most observers in the field employing it exclusively. Descriptive
exclusions do follow. So the question to be addressed is whether the
TPM is a necessary concomitant. 115 Here the answer is a strong
affirmative. Both approaches focus on critical points of incompleteness
in corporate contracts, points from which incentive problems and other
costly frictions tend to emanate. Focusing only on agency (or focusing
only on team production) leads to descriptive distortion.
This Part’s discussion also highlights the TPM’s limitations. The
authors, as they went about dotting all the i’s and crossing all the t’s on
their way to closure, carefully delimited their model’s field of
application. Strictly speaking, the TPM is not a theory of the firm but a
theory of a subset of firms—publicly traded corporations with separated
ownership and control 116 as they appeared at the time Blair and Stout
wrote in the late 1990s. The limitation bespeaks expedience but, as we
will see, also turns out to enhance the model’s robustness reserves.
Section III.A evaluates the TPM as economics. Section III.B
takes up Blair and Stout’s claim that the TPM is contractarian, finding
the claim to be justified and the TPM to be a more robust contractarian
exercise than its Chicago forebear. Section III.C enters a caveat to Blair
and Stout’s doctrinal account. Section III.D situates the TPM in the
corporate governance environment that prevailed at the time of its
Nothing in the TPM requires the board to ignore agency costs, even as the model does state that
agency-cost reduction cannot be the board’s exclusive concern.
113. See, e.g., Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organizational
Law, 110 YALE L.J. 387, 390 (2000) (implicitly countering the TPM by centering the capitalprotection function on asset partitioning).
114. Occam’s Razor, etc. Cf. BERTRAND RUSSELL, HISTORY OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY 462–63
(1945). The idea is that a simple explanation is superior to a complicated explanation. Many
subscribe to it.
115. The question could be phrased more broadly as whether an approach sensitive to internal
stability and conditions conducive to investment is a necessary concomitant. The TPM is not the
only such approach. See, e.g., William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Case Against
Shareholder Empowerment, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 653, 659–60 (2010) (stressing information
asymmetry); Zohar Goshen & Richard Squire, Principal Costs: A New Theory for Corporate Law
and Governance, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 767, 770 (2017) (stressing moral hazard on the part of the
principal). But the TPM is the leading such approach.
116. Blair & Stout, supra note 1, at 249 (suggesting that agency theory provides no insight
into the operation of public corporations even as it is important in understanding other firms).
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appearance in the late 1990s. Section III.E considers the implications
of governance developments since the turn of this century for the TPM.
A. The TPM as Economics
Blair and Stout’s model is a milestone in the history of corporate
law and economics because it is simultaneously methodologically
correct and normatively contrarian. It deploys rational actors to make
their own arrangements in a contractarian framework. Yet it
accommodates group as well as individual interests and privileges a
zone of discretion for allocational decisionmaking in its description of
productive arrangements. Before the TPM’s arrival, it looked as if
microeconomic methodology, market discipline, and an agency
description inclusive of shareholder primacy were inextricably bound
together. Blair and Stout showed that, as a matter of economics,
shareholder primacy could be cordoned off as a normative assertion
based on a contestable analysis. They also showed that stock market
discipline is not the only market discipline pertinent to corporate
governance. In the TPM’s vision of things, the salient market is the
product market: you need a well-functioning team to make a
competitive product, and absent a competitive product, you never get to
the stock market in the first place. By thus separating economic
methodology from the normative result of shareholder primacy, Blair
and Stout demonstrated the methodology’s potential to observers with
a range of normative perspectives. Corporate legal theory emerged with
a more robust framework of inquiry.
The TPM does more than separate the methodology from the
normative result. It also smacks down shareholder primacy as a
descriptive result. This happens implicitly. The TPM is stated
affirmatively, as a model should be. The authors do not pause to lay out
the components of shareholder primacy and rebut them one by one in
the argumentative style of legal writing. But the affirmative statement
of the model does indeed rebut.
Recall that in Jensen and Meckling, shareholder primacy
operates at the level of assumption—all constituents other than the
shareholders are assumed to have complete maximizing contracts. 117
For purposes of establishing the point as bedrock theory, an affirmative
case must be made, and not just in legal contexts. There is no
presumption favoring shareholder primacy in economic theory. In fact,
the theory is to the contrary. The first fundamental theorem of welfare
economics looks to economic efficiency conceived as maximum
117. See supra text accompanying note 37.
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aggregate wealth. 118 Marco Becht, Patrick Bolton, and Ailsa Röell
restate the theorem for a given system of corporate governance as
follows: a system is “ex-ante efficient if it generates the highest possible
payoff for all the parties involved, shareholders, creditors, employees,
clients, tax authorities, and other third parties that may be affected by
the corporation’s actions.” 119 This extension is uncontroversial and,
unsurprisingly, shows up as the operative objective in the TPM. 120 As
we have seen, 121 shareholder value maximization displaces general
maximization based on a further, two-part analysis grounded on the
one hand in shareholder vulnerability and on the other hand in the
incoherence of stakeholder governance.
The TPM quietly confronts both legs of this primacy case. It
begins by undermining the robustness of Jensen and Meckling’s
assumptions regarding completeness by showing that all team
members (and not just the shareholders) suffer from an incompleteness
problem. The model then deals with the shareholder vulnerability point
by accepting and assimilating it. There is no attempt at denial. Instead,
vulnerability becomes a justification for shareholder voting rights but
not a justification for an agency structure incorporating primacy. And
why not? Implicitly, the model predicts that the costs attending erosion
of the team’s integrity would be greater than the gains stemming from
further agency cost reduction. 122 Finally, there is the stakeholder
governance problem. The TPM averts it by refraining from advocating
stakeholder governance in the first place (even as it does advocate
consideration of stakeholder interests). Interestingly, the TPM at this
stage flows in the same stream as shareholder primacy—both hold that
the company needs a directive and authoritative hierarch in the form of
a board of directors. The difference is that the TPM board makes its
own policy where the primacy board is directed to perpend to
shareholder instructions magically communicated by the stock price.
A shareholder primacy advocate might take the TPM to task at
this point in the back-and-forth: even if the foregoing is persuasive, the
TPM fails because it builds in no metric for evaluating the performance
of the board and the managers. 123 Shareholder primacy, it argues,
118. See William W. Bratton & Simone M. Sepe, Corporate Law and the Myth of Efficient
Market Control, 105 CORNELL L. REV. 675, 695–96 (2020).
119. Becht et al., supra note 53, at 8.
120. See supra text accompanying note 95 (noting Blair and Stout’s definition of “interests of
the corporation” as a joint welfare function).
121. See supra text accompanying notes 54–58.
122. This implicit cost-benefit result also deflects shareholder primacy’s emphasis on the
shareholders’ pure financial incentives. See supra text accompanying note 57.
123. See, e.g., Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 50, at 440–41 (noting that the market price
of the stock should provide “the principal measure” of the shareholder interest); Jensen, supra note
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builds in the benefit of the stock price as a one-size-fits-all report card.
Absent this yardstick, managers cannot be held accountable for
suboptimal performance.
A response to this objection is implicit in the TPM. The TPM is
a model of publicly traded companies—it accordingly does not make the
stock price somehow disappear. The price stays in the picture as an
imperfect report card. What it cannot do in the TPM is serve as a onesize-fits-all maximization metric because it only measures the value of
the residual equity interest and cannot by itself tell us whether the
managers are maximizing welfare. This approach, which does not by
any stretch assert that the stock price lacks heuristic value, has the
great benefit of taking the stock price in a broader context. Given
inevitable information asymmetries between the firm and the market,
contextualization is necessary in any event. 124 This is a cogent response
to the shareholder proponents’ objection, if not a response so compelling
as to persuade them to renounce the faith.
One final point should be made on the TPM as economics. It is
not a formal model, even as it is derived from a sequence of formal
models. It accordingly is not quite economics. It is instead law and
economics, which is not a problem so far as concerns its place in legal
policy discussions. After all, Easterbrook and Fischel occupied the same
methodological space.
This hybrid status does leave the TPM unattached on the wider
academic landscape. Shareholder advocates see themselves as Jensen
and Meckling’s successors and enjoy the convenience of reference to the
copious theoretical and empirical literature on agency costs produced
by financial economists. The TPM, while derived from high theory, does
not enjoy such a cross-disciplinary source of support. Over in financial
economics, inquiry into incompleteness problems tends toward either
moral hazard or information-based explanations; there is no
comparable interest in teams. Not that support is utterly lacking. The
TPM enjoys an indirect line of confirmation from an information-based
model of management myopia (and an accompanying empirical
literature) that descends from theoretical work by Jeremy Stein. 125
56, at 9, 13 (noting that a multi-constituent model invites an increase in management agency
costs).
124. See Bratton & Wachter, supra note 115, at 691–96; see also Oliver Hart & Luigi Zingales,
Companies Should Maximize Shareholder Welfare Not Market Value, 2 J.L. FIN. & ACCT. 247, 248–
50 (2017) (contending that, given externalities, firms should maximize shareholder welfare net of
externalities rather than market value).
125. See Jeremy C. Stein, Takeover Threats and Managerial Myopia, 96 J. POL. ECON. 61, 63–
67 (1988) (showing formally that, even absent agency costs, managers of the firm threatened by a
takeover will sell an underpriced asset); Jeremy C. Stein, Efficient Capital Markets, Inefficient
Firms: A Model of Myopic Corporate Behavior, 104 Q.J. ECON. 655, 667 (1989) (modeling
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There is a notable confluence at both bottom lines: shareholder pressure
chokes firm-specific investment under both the TPM and the
myopia model.
B. The TPM as Contractarianism
Blair and Stout assert that the TPM is contractarian, but do not
elaborate. The assertion jars on the first encounter. Contractarianism
comes from Easterbrook and Fischel, a team famous not only for
introducing agency theory to corporate law 126 but also for privileging
efficiency over fairness, asserting that parties to corporate contracts
want whatever maximizes value regardless of any allocative
inequalities. 127 Blair and Stout reject the agency picture and make the
internal solution of allocative problems the touchstone of their
descriptive model. The contrast is stark.
But the TPM is indeed contractarian, much more so than is the
shareholder paradigm. Easterbrook and Fischel seek to merge
corporate law into a microeconomic agency account as fully as possible.
In so doing, their model validates the corporate law inheritance, 128
accepting self-interested behavior on management’s part (and resultant
agency costs) as an inevitable concomitant of the system. 129 Blair and
Stout pursue the same program. The shareholder paradigm, in
contrast, seeks affirmatively to reduce agency costs to zero in the teeth
of Jensen and Meckling. 130
The TPM, like Easterbrook and Fischel’s model, presupposes
evolution over time in a productive direction both for actual contracts
and for competitively derived provisions of corporate law. Blair and
Stout reject the account of charter competition as corruption, 131 an
account favored by some shareholder paradigm proponents. 132
Blair and Stout also abjure any concern with fairness. Even as
they worry about allocational disputes, they insist only that each team
member get a return in excess of their reservation price. Any further
suboptimal investment where managers maximize a weighted average of near-term stock prices
and long-run value).
126. See supra text accompanying notes 39–42.
127. The most famous exemplar of this thinking is their paper on corporate control. Frank H.
Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions, 91 YALE L.J. 698 (1982).
128. See supra text accompanying note 41.
129. See Easterbrook & Fischel, Contract, supra note 38, at 1417–18 (“Although managers are
self-interested, this interest can be aligned with that of investors through automatic devices,
devices that are useless when those in control are ‘disinterested’ . . . .”).
130. See Bratton & Wachter, supra note 115, at 688.
131. Blair & Stout, supra note 1, at 252–53.
132. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on
State Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1435, 1444 (1992).
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distributive considerations are remitted to the board of directors to be
dealt with in the context of the firm’s ongoing internal politics. The
TPM’s zone of discretion at this point accomplishes something that
proves difficult to do from an agency perspective—it leaves open an
opportunity for the mediating hierarch to take ethical concerns into
account on behalf of team members who contribute human capital.
Given an agency perspective, any financial sacrifices resulting from
ethical restraint give rise to a debilitating “other peoples’ money”
problem. 133
There are even strong parallels between Easterbrook and
Fischel and Blair and Stout regarding the statement of corporate
purpose. A good contractarian leaves the purpose of the firm over to the
contracting participants, keeping contractarian theory free of any
mandatory taint. Easterbrook and Fischel certainly play it this way,
going so far as to say “who cares?” about purpose. 134 But in the end, they
stumble onto the shareholder primacy party line. When the parties say
nothing about purpose, a term must be implied to serve as a
background default:
For most firms the expectation is that the residual riskbearers have contracted for a
promise to maximize long-run profits of the firm, which in turn maximizes the value of
their stock. Other participants contract for fixed payouts—monthly interest, salaries,
pensions, severance payments, and the like. This allocation of rights among the holders
of fixed and variable claims serves an economic function. Riskbearers get a residual claim
to profit; those who do not bear risk on the margin get fixed terms of trade. 135

This “promise to maximize long-run profits” is an odd promise
for a director or manager to make, and not because it puts the
shareholders first. The dissonance follows from the term “maximize.”
Who would ever promise to do that? How, in a complicated world, could
performance or breach be verified? An economist working in
shareholder primacy mode can construct a partial equilibrium model of
a problem that gets us from a stated here to an efficient, maximizing
there. That is the economist’s job, but it can be performed successfully
only under highly controlled conditions. 136 No such maximization
templates obtain in the real world of going concerns, where no one really
knows when wealth is being maximized. Moreover, even if someone
derived a plausible maximizing template for a given producing context,
corporate law would make no attempt to impose it, so powerful (and
133. Milton Friedman, A Friedman Doctrine—the Social Responsibility of Business Is to
Increase Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 13, 1970), https://www.nytimes.com/1970/09/13/archives/afriedman-doctrine-the-social-responsibility-of-business-is-to.html [https://perma.cc/8SMM-56JL].
134. Easterbrook & Fischel, Contract, supra note 38, at 1446.
135. Id. at 1446–47.
136. Bratton & Sepe, supra note 118, at 696–98.
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practical) is the business judgment inheritance. To interpolate a
promise to maximize in the real world is to allow the economics to
dominate the law in the fused description in a way that makes no sense.
The best that corporate law can do is to facilitate the corporation’s
attempt to maximize the value it produces. The contractual equivalent
is the standard “best efforts” formulation.
Blair and Stout, as proper contractarians, are sparing in their
use of maximization terms. “Maximize” and “maximization” show up
only twenty-one times in A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law
(usually in connection with the citation or description of the work of
others); “efficient” and “efficiency” similarly appear only twenty-one
times; and “optimal” is used a bare eleven times. This reticence works
in tandem with the model’s second-best aspirations—efficient results
are not to be expected. Furthermore, the mediating hierarchs
themselves, the members of the board, do not even occupy the secondbest space. They are trustees looking for modest returns in their
personal accounts, acquitting themselves of a duty. Given that, a
promise to maximize is doubly improbable. Meanwhile, the directors’
duty makes its first appearance in the TPM phrased defensively—the
board’s job is to protect the team members’ firm-specific investments. 137
This is a sensible formulation. Unfortunately, Blair and Stout keep
going only to stumble upon a maximization directive in the end: the
mediating hierarch’s “primary function is to exercise [its] control in a
fashion that maximizes the joint welfare of the team as a whole.” 138 As
we have seen, they are in distinguished company as they stumble. Like
Easterbrook and Fischel, they interpolate a maximand as an implied,
default term, drawing on their economic model for inspiration. It is a
momentary and forgivable lapse in both cases.
It also bears noting that Blair and Stout’s fusion of the legal
model and the economic description carries the contractarian project a
step farther along, for they accept the legal inheritance in all
particulars. Easterbrook and Fischel, in contrast, found that the
contractarian presumption favoring the inherited legal dispensation
could be overcome as regards hostile takeovers, as to which they made
a prominent law reform suggestion—a ban on defensive responses. 139
The suggestion is in turn unsurprising—the hostile takeover is the

137. Blair & Stout, supra note 1, at 253.
138. Id. at 271 (emphasis added).
139. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target’s Management
in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161, 1164 (1981) (“[S]hareholders’ welfare is
maximized by an externally imposed legal rule severely limiting the ability of managers to resist
a tender offer even if the purpose of resistance is to trigger a bidding contest.”).
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linchpin of Easterbrook and Fischel’s system of market controls. 140
Blair and Stout, as we have seen, boldly accept corporate law’s
permissive envelopes for takeover defense and reinvestment of free cash
flow. 141 The comparison is telling—where Easterbrook and Fischel are
forced to gloss over a big sticking point, the TPM’s fusion works neatly.
C. The TPM as Corporate Law
As we have seen, the TPM has doctrinal sticking points of its
own, however impressive the overall neatness of fit. And they cannot be
analyzed and distinguished away. The problem lies in the doctrine’s
equivocation regarding the legal statement of corporate purpose and
the shareholders’ place in it. Delaware, going back at least to the
watershed 1984 case of Aronson v. Lewis, holds that the board owes its
fiduciary obligations “to the corporation and its shareholders.” 142 The
formulation leaves in place the doctrinal superstructure described by
Blair and Stout; it does not declare an agency. But it also appears to
bring in the shareholders as contingent fiduciary beneficiaries, opening
the door to a fiduciary breach triggered by a defensive or other
allocative action injurious to the shareholder interest.

140. At this critical point, Easterbrook and Fischel’s contractarianism overlaps the
shareholder paradigm—their reform suggestion presages the shareholder paradigm’s later agency
cost reductive law reform program.
141. See supra text accompanying notes 97–99.
142. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811 (Del. 1984). Significantly, the statement in the
opinion footnotes to a string cite of law review articles that includes a range of positions. The
court’s comment is open-ended: “The broad question of structuring the modern corporation in order
to satisfy the twin objectives of managerial freedom of action and responsibility to shareholders
has been extensively debated by commentators.” Id. at 811 n.4; accord N. Am. Cath. Educ.
Programming Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92, 99 (Del. 2007) (“It is well established that
the directors owe their fiduciary obligations to the corporation and its shareholders.”); Mills
Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1280 (Del. 1989) (“In discharging [the board’s
function to manage the corporation], the directors owe fiduciary duties of care and loyalty to the
corporation and its shareholders.”); Polk v. Good, 507 A.2d 531, 536 (Del. 1986) (“In performing
their duties the directors owe fundamental fiduciary duties of loyalty and care to the corporation
and its shareholders.”); In re Trados Inc. S’holder Litig., 73 A.3d 17, 36–37 (Del. Ch. 2013) (“This
formulation captures the foundational relationship in which directors owe duties to the corporation
for the ultimate benefit of the entity’s residual claimants. Nevertheless, ‘stockholders’ best interest
must always, within legal limits, be the end. Other constituencies may be considered only
instrumentally to advance that end.’ ”).
There is a similar equivocation in the best-known legal statement of the purpose of the
corporation (as opposed to the purpose of corporate law), the statement contained in section 2.01(a)
of the American Law Institute’s Principles of Corporate Governance: “a corporation [ ] should have
as its objective the conduct of business activities with a view to enhancing corporate profit and
shareholder gain.” PRINCIPLES OF CORP. GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
§ 2.01(a) (Am. L. Inst. 1994).
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Blair and Stout address and dismiss this quirk in the doctrine
in their treatment of the famous 1919 case, Dodge v. Ford Motor Co. 143
Henry Ford, the closely held motor company’s controlling shareholder,
was withholding dividend payments. An enormous cash hoard had
accumulated. The Dodge brothers, minority shareholders and
competitors, claimed a breach of fiduciary duty. Ford posed an
innovative managerialist defense—the business plan should pass
inspection because it benefitted employees and consumers. He lost: “[a]
business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit
of the stockholders,” said the Michigan Supreme Court. 144 Blair and
Stout are unconcerned, telling us that Dodge v. Ford is a close
corporation case and, viewed as such, should not be read as a bold
traversal of the public corporation’s business judgment envelope; it
should instead be seen as an uncontroversial intervention against a
majority shareholder effecting an unequal allocation. 145 Close
corporations, in any event, lie outside of the TPM’s clearly stated
bounds.
Delaware recently replayed Dodge in eBay Domestic Holdings,
Inc. v. Newmark. 146 There, the majority interest in a close corporation,
Craigslist, Inc., invoked community welfare to justify defensive
measures against a minority shareholder interested in monetization.
They were slapped down in Chancery: “Having chosen a for-profit
corporate form, the [C]raigslist directors are bound by the fiduciary
duties and standards that accompany that form. Those standards
include acting to promote the value of the corporation for the benefit of
its stockholders.” 147 Significantly, Blair and Stout would pose exactly
the same distinction—Craigslist being a close corporation—with
explicit support from language in the eBay opinion. 148 Delaware courts
otherwise wax eloquent about maximizing for the common stock only in
cases involving common-preferred stock conflicts. 149 Just as Blair and
Stout predict, they avoid committing themselves to shareholder

143. 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919).
144. Id. at 684.
145. Blair & Stout, supra note 1, at 301–02.
146. 16 A.3d 1 (Del. Ch. 2010).
147. Id. at 34.
148. Id. at 28–31 (stressing that the case law on poison pills concerns publicly traded
companies, not close corporations).
149. See, e.g., In re Trados Inc. S’holder Litig., 73 A.3d 17, 40–41 (Del. Ch. 2013) (“[T]he
standard of conduct for directors requires that they strive in good faith and on an informed basis
to maximize the value of the corporation for the benefit of its residual claimants, the ultimate
beneficiaries of the firm’s value, not for the benefit of its contractual claimants.”).
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primacy in respect of public corporations 150 lacking a controlling
shareholder. 151
A question nonetheless arises about the state of the law: Could
Dodge v. Ford happen today in respect of a publicly traded company
under separated ownership and control? I answer yes: if the case came
up again in Delaware with the same arguments on the table, it would
come out the same way. A business run for the benefit of employees
would be held to traverse the rights of the shareholders in the
“corporation and its shareholders.” The answer does not much
destabilize the TPM, however, for Dodge would never come up with the
same arguments on the table. The defending board would obscure its
managerialist objectives in the language of long-term corporate profit
and shareholder-value enhancement. So long as the defending
managers grounded their case in a justificatory record (a task easily
accomplished) and were not otherwise self-dealing, their allocational
acts would be covered by the cloak of business judgment. The TPM’s
envelope of discretion would persist.
A caveat must be entered nonetheless. Management is
privileged to wear the business judgment cloak only if it remains ready
to pay lip service to the shareholder interest. Commitment to the
shareholder interest must never be explicitly denied, whatever the
occulted truth. Management must genuflect when challenged. And it
routinely does so, knowing that the ritual has performative value. It is
in management’s interest to hew to the norm, for it emerges from the
act of worship at the shareholder altar with its own power and position
legitimated. Thus did the Business Roundtable bow to the shareholders
in its first Statement on Corporate Governance, issued in 1997. 152
Meanwhile, legal ambiguity prevails—a constructive ambiguity.
In the century since Dodge, the issue has never been joined in respect

150. Even the Revlon rule, originally framed in terms of maximization, came in for relaxation.
See, e.g., Barkan v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 567 A.2d 1279, 1286 (Del. 1989) (“[T]he basic teaching of
[Revlon and its related] precedents is simply that the directors must act in accordance with their
fundamental duties of care and loyalty.”).
151. Given a controlling shareholder, the Delaware courts do exalt the status of the
shareholders—minority shareholders—particularly in merger cases. See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc.,
457 A.2d 701, 715 (Del. 1983) and its many progeny. These situations are not within the zone
covered by the TPM. A question arises as to whether the line drawing that leads to the exclusion
is unduly expedient. These can be large enterprises reliant on their teams, suggesting that the
exclusion is ill constructed. At the same time, the disputes covered lie within the shareholder
precinct and do not directly concern providers of human capital. Moreover, given a controlled
board, a mediating hierarch is absent as regards the complainants. It follows that Blair and Stout
had no choice but to draw the line.
152. BUS. ROUNDTABLE, STATEMENT ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, 1–4 (Sept. 1997) (“The
Business Roundtable wishes to emphasize that the principal objective of a business enterprise is
to generate economic returns to its owners.”).
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of investment and earnings retention policy at a public company. No
manager wants a challenge, and, remarkably, no shareholder plaintiff
has ever pushed a manager into a corner on an allocative action, at least
outside of the context of a sale of the company. Such is the genius of
corporate law, a genius captured by the TPM.
Let us nonetheless join the issue. Here is the hypothetical. A
manufacturing firm employs skilled laborers, who contribute high value
added as they produce a premium product. The company has a secure
market share. Miraculously, a technician at the company invents a new
mechanized process that can do most of the work done by the skilled
laborers for a fraction of the cost. If the new process is deployed, the
company will fire half of its workers, substantially lower its costs, and
double its stock price even as revenues stay the same. Alternatively, the
company can hold onto its market share and its revenue stream but
retain the workers and suppress the new technology. Management,
which believes that the existence of the technology can be kept secret,
opts for suppression out of loyalty to its employees.
The question is whether the suppressing board will be held to
have breached its fiduciary duty when a disgruntled whistleblower
discloses all to a plaintiff’s lawyer. I predict that it would be held so to
do. The decision to suppress the technology would at a minimum be
deemed antithetical to the company’s best interest and so in bad faith.
The prediction cuts against Blair and Stout’s description of
corporate law, but only a little. Note how careful one must be in crafting
a hypothetical. If we resituate the case in a larger enterprise in which
the particular product amounts to only ten percent of the business, I
would have no trouble getting the decision back inside the business
judgment tent—management could obscure the allocation as necessary
for employee relations in the context of the company as a whole.
Summing up, although corporate law does elevate the
shareholders to primus inter pares status, it so equivocates as it does so
that it leaves the TPM standing.
D. The TPM as History
We now ask how well the TPM synchronizes with corporate
governance practice. It turns out that the tightness of fit varies
depending on the moment in history.
Blair and Stout state their contractarian fusion of law and
economics ahistorically, as one would expect. But the model is
nonetheless sensitive to historical contingency and has close ties to the
posture of corporate governance at the time of its appearance. Indeed,
the TPM could not credibly have appeared earlier than the late 1990s,
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even though its managerialist aspect recalls the postwar period. The
managers of the 1950s and 1960s arguably were the greatest in history
when it came to the advancement of non-shareholder team members’
welfare—those were the folks who invented employer-subsidized
healthcare. 153 But any attempt to situate the TPM in management’s
golden age stalls quickly. The TPM depends absolutely on an
independent, substantially disinterested monitoring board 154 that
stands in as a credible trustee to which team members can surrender
their property rights with confidence. Such boards first appeared
during the 1970s, and then only in theory. 155 They gradually came to
dominate in practice in the two succeeding decades. When the TPM
appeared at the end of the 1990s, it had only recently become safe to
assume that publicly traded companies had majority independent
boards. 156 Decades earlier, during management’s palmy days, the board
was moribund, and a model insisting on a central place for board
independence would not have enjoyed descriptive credibility.
The late 1990s suit the TPM in another respect. It was,
relatively speaking, a quiet time. The takeover wars of the 1980s were
over, and the next century’s scandals and activist interventions were
yet to come. Still, Blair and Stout had to look to backward and bring the
takeover wars into the team picture. In TPM terms, the hostile
takeovers of the 1980s amounted to a shareholder attack aimed at
adjusting a prevailing team coalition settlement. Corporations emerged
in the 1990s under a new, more shareholder-oriented settlement built
on equity compensation plans that reoriented manager incentives
towards stock price enhancement. 157 Blair and Stout accept this and
153. William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, Tracking Berle’s Footsteps: The Trail of The
Modern Corporation’s Last Chapter, 33 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 849, 867–70 (2010).
154. See supra text accompanying note 65.
155. For a picture of governance during the managerialist era, see Edward S. Mason, The
Apologetics of “Managerialism,” 31 J. BUS. 1, 1–5 (1958). During that period, monitoring gravitated
over to the hands of government authorities, which mediated between producing companies and
the markets. See Berle, supra note 16, at xxv. The shareholder franchise was likewise irrelevant,
the annual vote for the board of directors having degenerated into a meaningless ritual. See ADOLF
A. BERLE, JR., POWER WITHOUT PROPERTY: A NEW DEVELOPMENT IN AMERICAN POLITICAL
ECONOMY 104–05 (1959) (describing a stockholders’ vote as “apt to be a pale affair”).
156. Today it is safe to assume that they have super-majority independent boards. See William
W. Bratton, Reconsidering the Evolutionary Erosion Account of Corporate Fiduciary Law 51 (Univ.
of Pa. Carey L. Sch. Inst. for L. & Econ., Rsch. Paper No. 21-04, 2021),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3753589
[https://perma.cc/UW8W-43YR]
(“All of the Dow companies, all but one of the midcap companies, and all but four of the small cap
companies reported super-majority independent boards.”).
157. The best description of this shift is Holmstrom & Kaplan, supra note 59, at 121–23.
Holmstrom and Kaplan survey the evolution of shareholder-manager relations, noting that a
regime of market-oriented corporate governance emerged in the wake of the 1980s. They depict
the takeover wars as a reaction to an external shock caused by economic factors such as
deregulation, globalization, and new information and communications technologies. The financial
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describe a mediating hierarch making a political adjustment to the
waxing of institutional investor influence and the waning of trade union
influence. 158 Alternatively, they ascribe the change to international
economic competition—the shareholders’ reservation price went up
even as the labor market saw downward pressure on employee
returns. 159 Either way or both ways, power had shifted to the
shareholders with the TPM description otherwise remaining intact.
Now let us turn our attention to another 1980s phenomenon, the
management buyout, which interplays interestingly with the TPM’s
definitional limitation to publicly traded companies under separated
ownership and control. To go private is to exit the TPM: because the
buyout implicates control transfer to a blockholder and delisting, the
buyout target no longer has separated ownership and control.
Management buyouts resembled hostile takeovers in reflecting the shift
in public shareholders’ favor, for they too cashed public shareholders
out at a premium. The difference was that the incumbent management
group worked cooperatively with a financial intermediary in a friendly
transaction (even as it laid itself open to the disciplinary ministrations
of a control party postclosing). The objective was leveraged
restructuring and an enhanced return on equity, and, as was the case
with many hostile offers, the transaction led to brutal cost cutting and
reductions in workforce. Buyout deals turned on defection against
inside team members by management incumbents looking for jackpot
personal payoffs. This is not the way of the TPM. Blair and Stout’s
definitional line drawing finesses the problem. To go private, they
explain, is to determine that agency problems so dominate as to justify
a shift away from the team coalition to a shareholder-controlled
board. 160 The point is a fair one, and the line of demarcation holds.
But there is a residual element of disquiet. Management buyouts
are about leveraged speculation and defection against the team as well
as agency cost reduction. 161 The target eviscerates its team even as it
stays in the product market with its profile unchanged, suggesting that
markets, they observe, showed a comparative advantage over management in undertaking the
structural adjustments made necessary by the changes. The shift to market control, viewed from
this perspective, followed neither from its intrinsic superiority respecting capital allocation nor
from a structurally embedded level of excess agency costs, but from transitory economic factors.
For Holmstrom and Kaplan, takeovers were a one-time-only external shock that did not imply a
permanent shift of the locus of production decisionmaking from within the firm to outside markets.
Id. at 137.
158. Blair & Stout, supra note 1, at 325–26.
159. Id. at 326.
160. Id. at 322.
161. WILLIAM W. BRATTON, CORPORATE FINANCE: CASES AND MATERIALS 517–18 (8th ed.
2016).
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team cohesion may not be as essential as the TPM asserts. As the flow
of companies from public to private by buyout increases, the real-world
productivity advantages of team governance diminish. Happily, by the
time the TPM appeared in the late 1990s, the leveraged restructuring
moment seemed to have passed. Neither leveraged hostile takeovers
nor leveraged management buyouts were occurring in significant
numbers. 162
There was also notable movement from private to public on the
startup front during the late 1990s, a movement tending to confirm the
TPM’s robustness. 163 Venture capital (“VC”) startups manage to achieve
teamwork in the absence of the TPM’s independent, mediating board.
VC deal structures tend to split the board between a founder and the
founder’s designees and designees of the venture capitalist who holds
convertible preferred stock. 164 To be sure, many structures include a
link to the logic of the TPM: where the VC and the founder are allocated
equal numbers of board seats, there is also a nominally independent tiebreaker director. 165 Overall, however, VC startup governance is
characterized by a principal-agent structure channeled through
elaborate negotiated mechanisms that allocate not only control but also
return on investment. Such a setup lies outside the TPM’s well-defined
limits. But, at the time the TPM appeared in the late 1990s, there were
no negative implications. Startup success meant an IPO and eventual
transition to separated ownership and control. 166 For all that appeared,
a shift to team governance was an inevitable concomitant of
organizational maturity.
Thus was 1999 the perfect moment for the TPM. Independence
finally prevailed in boardrooms. There was little hostility (and hostile
takeovers never did come back). There was little movement from public
to private. An unprecedented spate of VC IPOs magnified the team
model’s salience. Even as incentive structures had evolved to adjust the
scales in the shareholders’ favor at public companies, separated
ownership and control and team production, thus adjusted, still
prevailed as the governance mode for large enterprises.

162. Id. at 513, 1116–17.
163. For further discussion of the TPM’s interplay with venture capital governance, see
Elizabeth Pollman, Startup Governance, 168 U. PA. L. REV. 155, 177–78 (2019).
164. Steven N. Kaplan & Per Strömberg, Financial Contracting Theory Meets the Real World:
An Empirical Analysis of Venture Capital Contracts, 70 REV. ECON. STUD. 281, 287–90 (2003).
165. Brian J. Broughman, The Role of Independent Directors in Startup Firms, 2010 UTAH L.
REV. 461, 468–71 (2010).
166. See Steve Blank, When Founders Go Too Far, HARV. BUS. REV.,
https://hbr.org/2017/11/when-founders-go-too-far
(last
visited
Sept.
25,
2021)
[https://perma.cc/MEX9-DKJ2].
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E. The TPM in History
Developments in corporate governance since the turn of this
century have not gone the TPM’s way, at least at first glance. The power
shift in the shareholders’ direction has intensified markedly, so much
so that the problem of separated ownership and control has been
pronounced solved. 167 At the same time (and perhaps ironically), fewer
companies operate under separated ownership and control, 168 partly
due to a renewed trend toward privatization and partly due to
continuing concentration through mergers. It seems that team integrity
matters less and less, detracting from the TPM’s economic and policy
salience. But let us take a closer look.
The continued shift of power to shareholders by no means
negates the TPM. The shift follows in the first instance from activist
hedge fund interventions in business planning. These engagements do
cut against the case made in A Team Production Theory of Corporate
Law—the activists so invigorate the shareholder franchise as to
superannuate the TPM’s characterization of shareholder voting. 169 But
they do not somehow turn the hedge funds into juridical principals. The
successful activist usually leaves the independent mediating board in
place, working with the existing team and the received legal model. 170
The activists use the franchise to lever their way to a place at the
business planning table 171 and then use board representatives for
ongoing monitoring. The difference is that the mediators are now much
more likely to favor items on shareholder agendas. The items—asset
sales, cost cutting, share buybacks, and sell-side mergers—look to
monetize investments in the firm and channel the proceeds into
shareholder pockets, thereby making the environment less protective of
firm-specific investment. The follow-on question, in the view of many,
is whether the pendulum has shifted so far in the direction of shortterm monetization and away from productive long-term investment. 172
167. Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism: Activist
Investors and the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 863, 865, 867, 874 (2013).
168. See Margaret M. Blair, Are Publicly Traded Corporations Disappearing?, 105 CORNELL
L. REV. 641, 653–73 (2020) (highlighting the “decline in the number of IPOs and in the number of
publicly traded corporations since 2000”).
169. See supra text accompanying note 105–106.
170. William W. Bratton, Hedge Funds and Governance Targets, 95 GEO. L.J. 1375, 1405–09
(2007).
171. Bratton & Sepe, supra note 118, at 692–94.
172. See, e.g., ERNST & YOUNG, STUDY ON DIRECTORS’ DUTIES AND SUSTAINABLE CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE: FINAL REPORT 37 (2020) (prepared for the Eur. Comm’n):
[T]he prominence of shareholder primacy in corporate governance and the pressure it
generates to pursue short-term profit maximisation leads board members not to take
sufficient account of the long-term interests of stakeholders other than shareholders (such
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Thus in 2019 did the Business Roundtable, taking advantage of growing
skepticism regarding shareholder primacy, withdraw its 1997
endorsement. 173 As the question about perverse effects looms larger, the
TPM’s policy salience undergoes restoration.
The trend toward privatization does not negate the TPM either,
even as it certainly does entail movement away from independent
boards and their teams in favor of institutional shareholder control.
Management buyouts for all intents and purposes had disappeared
when the TPM appeared in the late 1990s. Thereafter, in the wake of
the market correction of 2000–2002, they returned to the frontline of
the mergers and acquisitions market (rebranded as private equity) and
have held their place ever since. 174 Very few private-equity targets
return to public trading as stand-alone companies, although many do
return to separated ownership and control after being sold to public
corporations in strategic mergers. 175 At the same time, many targets
stay private indefinitely. 176
Prior to 2020, we also experienced a periodic decline in the
number of IPOs of VC-backed startups. This resulted from an expanded
base of private capital, a willingness to delay the incurrence of
regulatory costs, 177 increased numbers of private sales, 178 and perhaps
the economics of options (delay preserves option value). But the
question went less to the ultimate advantages of a public listing than to
the costs and benefits determining the length of delay. Here too, then,
the TPM still stands, albeit with a reduced zone of operation.
The TPM, in sum, still fits corporate governance practice,
although not nearly as neatly as it did twenty years ago. How then does
the TPM look today when compared to its rivals in corporate legal
theory—Easterbrook and Fischel’s contractarianism and the
as employees, creditors, suppliers, customers and the society at large as well as the
environment);
COLIN MAYER, FIRM COMMITMENT: WHY THE CORPORATION IS FAILING US AND HOW TO RESTORE
TRUST IN IT (2013) (arguing for binding statements of commitment to broad welfare enhancement).
ROUNDTABLE,
173. Statement
on
the
Purpose
of
a
Corporation,
BUS.
https://opportunity.businessroundtable.org/ourcommitment/ (last visited Aug. 21, 2021)
[https://perma.cc/GM9N-G5F8] (“While each of our individual companies serves its own corporate
purpose, we share a fundamental commitment to all of our stakeholders.”); see also Larry Fink, A
Sense
of
Purpose:
Larry
Fink’s
2018
Letter
to
CEOs,
BLACKROCK,
https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/investor-relations/2018-larry-fink-ceo-letter (last visited
Nov. 5, 2021) [https://perma.cc/GJV2-4UEY] (“Society is demanding that companies, both public
and private, serve a social purpose.”).
174. BRATTON, supra note 161, at 542–551.
175. Id. at 520–21.
176. The private equity firms sell them to one another in so-called secondary buyouts. Id.
177. Renee M. Jones, The Unicorn Governance Trap, 166 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 165, 171–74
(2017).
178. Blank, supra note 166, at 99.
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shareholder paradigm? Proponents of both theories doubtless will have
found much to celebrate as the shareholders have racked up real-world
victories. But as between the two rival theories, only the contractarian
model comes away looking more robust in light of recent events. Indeed,
corporate governance now finally begins to look the way Easterbook and
Fischel said it looked three decades ago. Shareholder empowerment for
the most part follows from ground level changes in markets and
financial institutions—changes that reduce agency costs—much as the
contractarian model predicts. 179 Its accomplishment validates ex post a
description that fell short of accuracy at the time it appeared. The
shareholder paradigm, in contrast, is falsified by recent developments
in practice. It counsels that embedded institutional arrangements
prevent shareholder empowerment and foster permanently excessive
agency costs, necessitating law reform. As it has turned out, there was
nothing embedded about shareholder disempowerment. No reform has
been necessary.
Corporate legal theory now enters a phase well-suited to a
contractarian perspective. It has two contractarian models on which to
draw, one based on agency and the other the TPM. They are best viewed
as complementary to one another.
CONCLUSION
Blair and Stout intervened in the midst of corporate legal
theory’s long, agency-centric run to show that the set of available
microeconomic referents was larger and more descriptively rich than
could be yielded by a framework strictly focused on agency cost
reduction. They put forward a cogent counter-story that focused on
management’s role in marshalling factors of production rather than
management’s relationship with public equity holders. They parried
every thrust made in the patchwork of theories surrounding
shareholder primacy and successfully contended that their description
better accounted for the terms of corporate law. They also redirected
corporate law and economics from a collection of extensions of the
Jensen and Meckling model to the basic teaching of the first theorem of
welfare economics.
And they were right about a lot of things. But even as they
earned a place at the table, they did not upset the agency-centric apple
cart because they sought to legitimize management power where most
others saw an embedded accountability problem. This disposition
179. Legal reform has played a strictly secondary role. Bratton & Sepe, supra note 118, at 724
n.177.
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bespeaks the view that agency costs outweigh in magnitude the costs of
team disruption, a view less driven by conclusive empirical findings
than by normative priors. Corporate law scholarship, like all legal
scholarship, is at bottom normative. Within its normative frame of
reference, nothing more consistently excites academic engagement than
the sight of power without accountability. The turn to empirical inquiry
and interdisciplinary reference to theories from social science does not
change this normative orientation, even as it certainly does mean an
increase in the volume of descriptive scholarship.
At the same time, new directions in corporate law scholarship
are driven by developments in practice, and the arrival of the hedge
fund activists has been a paradigm-shifting practical development. The
separation of ownership and control is no longer corporate law’s great
unsolved problem. The new question is whether we have entered a new
era of power without accountability, this time on the shareholder side.
Given an affirmative answer, the TPM matters more than ever.
Where, then, are we going? The management moral hazard
problem has not gone away, even as the growing influence of
shareholders fosters just the sorts of perverse effects highlighted by the
TPM. The theoretical question posed is not an either/or—do we stick
with an exclusive focus on management moral hazard or go with team
production (or management myopia or whatever you prefer to call it)?
We inevitably will be doing both—it will be markets and
hierarchies 180—and we do not have a theory that tells us in a nice, neat
box how to do both at once. We accordingly find ourselves weighing a
growing list of costs and benefits. This is an uncomfortable place to be
for a field that is only really comfortable following a clear-cut normative
vector. Round and round we’ll go between shareholder value and stable
production environments and concern about externalities, and where
we stop is anybody’s guess. One thing can be predicted safely:
developments in practice will determine the stop point, as they always
have in the past.
I will add a tentative, contractarian projection. Suppose that
private ordering continues to work well and advances to a higher level:
We evolve past today’s one-size-fits-all governance model to a new level
at which (1) all parties in interest take a company-specific view of items
180. Cf. OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM: FIRMS,
MARKETS, RELATIONAL CONTRACTING 294–97 (1985) (recognizing the firm entity as a hierarchical
governance structure significantly distinguishable from market contracting and focusing on
bounded rationality and opportunistic conduct as limitations on market contracting). Oliver
Williamson later posited an intermediate category. See Oliver E. Williamson, The Theory of the
Firm as Governance Structure: From Choice to Contract, 16 J. ECON. PERSPS. 171, 180–81 (2002).
Williamson’s category does not, however, describe today’s shareholder-directed public
corporations.
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on activist agendas, scrupulously weighing short-term results against
long-term opportunities, and (2) boards of directors, activists, and other
institutional shareholders learn how to contract with each other to
determine suitable, company-specific power allocations. 181 It could
follow that the power without accountability problem would again fade
to the rear and that corporate governance would drop back from the
policy margin to become a quieter, more technical precinct. The
projected environment would occupy a place much like that presently
occupied by corporate decisionmaking concerning capital structure—
a place where business judgment and arm’s length contracting
operate largely unregulated in the absence of handwringing
about accountability.

181. Cf. ALEX EDMANS, GROW THE PIE: HOW GREAT COMPANIES DELIVER BOTH PURPOSE AND
PROFIT 38–57 (2020) (arguing that while growing the pie and attending constituent concerns is
inconsistent with shareholder primacy, it does often maximize profits in the long run).

